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ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS AN
INFORMATION PROBLEM
HOLLY DOREMUS**
Enthusiasm for adaptive management has outrun evaluation of its
usefulness as a natural resource management tool. Policymakers
routinely endorse, and frequently require, it. Managers and academic
observers alike have tended to assume that adaptive management is
uniformly the best strategy. Little has been said, particularly in the
policy literature, about how to decide whether an adaptive management
approach makes sense. Looking at adaptive management as an
information problem, this Article argues that adaptive management
should be used only when it promises to improve management
outcomes sufficiently to justify the additional costs it imposes. An
explicit formal analysis of the prospects for learning and the value of
learning for management should precede any decision to engage in
adaptive management. For large-scale, long-term, or high-profile
adaptive management programs, that analysis should be reviewed by
outside experts and periodically reexamined. The type of analysis
recommended here would help limit the use of adaptive management to
appropriate circumstances, improve implementation when adaptive
management is adopted, and enhance accountability. It would also
highlight situations in which learning would be valuable for managers
but appears too costly or difficult. The analysis should highlight
barriers to learning. Many will be context specific, but others are
systematic. This Article offers suggestions for addressing some of the
most common systematic impediments to learning.
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INTRODUCTION
This symposium broadly considers the ability of law to change in
response to changing circumstances and knowledge (adaptive
capacity), and to retain its fundamental form in the face of exogenous
challenges (resilience).' In the natural resource management context,
the current interest in resilience and adaptability is largely driven by
climate change, which raises questions about whether law can keep
up with an environment whose rate of change exceeds that for which
human institutions were designed, and whether existing law can
withstand the new stresses it is beginning to encounter.2 This Article
approaches those questions through the lens of adaptive
management, a strategy that theoretically promotes both adaptation
and resilience. I argue that, despite its theoretical appeal, adaptive
management is not useful for all management problems and should
not be adopted without an explicit evaluation of its benefits and costs.
Adaptive management arouses both much enthusiasm and much
skepticism.' The theory is an attractive one, promising a way to make
decisions in the face of current uncertainty while also reducing
1. For definitions of both resilience and adaptive capacity, see J.B. Ruhl, General
Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems - with
Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1375-76, 1388 (2011).
2. See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of
Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405 (2011) (discussing the extent to
which climate change exacerbates existing resource management challenges and
introduces new ones).
3. The literature "tells a conflicting story; one could conclude that adaptive
management should either be relied upon heavily or criticized sharply when considering
solutions to challenging resource management problems." R. Gregory et al.,
Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications to Environmental
Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2411 (2006).
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uncertainty over time.4 The core concept of adaptive management is
that the management process should incorporate, rather than follow,
learning about the managed system. An adaptive management
framework explicitly builds in opportunities for learning and
adjustment.' Ideally, that creates a resilient institutional structure for
adapting to change.
Enthusiasm has spilled over to the policy arena, where adaptive
management is now routinely endorsed, and even mandated. When it
comes to implementation, however, skepticism becomes the rule.
Documented instances of successful adaptive management are rare,
and many touted examples diverge significantly from the theoretical
ideal.' Furthermore, adaptive management can create a new type of
accountability problem, providing cover that allows resource
management agencies to put off imposing politically controversial
limits on economic activity.'
I share the skepticism about the politics of adaptive
management, but I also share the sense that it is both inevitable and
in some contexts desirable. That makes it important to examine and
4. See, e.g., James E. Lyons et al., Monitoring in the Context of Structured Decision-
Making and Adaptive Management, 72 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1683, 1691 (2008) ("Adaptive
management has been widely recognized as having tremendous potential to solve
problems in natural resource management, and calls for implementation of adaptive
management are becoming more common....").
5. See discussion infra Part I.A.2-3.
6. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 85308(f) (Deering 2010) (mandating that a
management plan, to be prepared by the newly established Delta Stewardship Council,
include "a science-based, transparent, and formal adaptive management strategy for
ongoing ecosystem restoration and water management decisions"); Chesapeake Bay
Protection and Restoration, Exec. Order No. 13,508, § 203(e), 74 Fed. Reg. 23,099, 23,100
(May 12, 2009) (requiring that federal agencies develop a Chesapeake Bay strategy that,
among other things, "describe[s] a process for the implementation of adaptive
management principles, including a periodic evaluation of protection and restoration
activities"); Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring Problem, 83 U. COLO.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papersssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1680000 (noting that agencies have embraced adaptive
management); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95
MINN. L. REV. 424, 424 (2010) (explaining that adaptive management "has become
infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity").
7. See, e.g., Catherine Allan & Allan Curtis, Nipped in the Bud: Why Regional Scale
Adaptive Management Is Not Blooming, 36 ENVTL. MGMT. 414, 417 (2005); Beth C.
Bryant, Adapting to Uncertainty: Law, Science, and Management in the Steller Sea Lion
Controversy, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 209 (2009) (noting that large-scale adaptive
management experimentation "presently suffers from a sorry success rate").
8. Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2411.
9. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50,
52 (2001); Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2411.
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deal with its challenges. And that, in turn, is a tall order. Adaptive
management is like the elephant being examined by the blind men in
the well-known tale: every different aspect explored reveals a new
challenge.
Several of the challenges have been recognized and are being
addressed from both scientific and policy perspectives. Without
denigrating their importance, therefore, I set them aside here. There
is no question that adaptive management poses incentives problems,
accountability problems, and flexibility problems.o In this Article,
however, I choose to focus on a different part of the elephant, one
that has been less explored by policy wonks. Adaptive management
is, in important ways, an information problem. It depends on the
ability to fill information gaps over time under challenging conditions.
It cannot be used appropriately or effectively without confronting
that piece of the puzzle. I make no claim that information is the entire
elephant-of course it is not. What I do claim, though, is that
information is an important part of the elephant, one that deserves
more of our attention.
I focus on information for three reasons. First, the information
problem inherent in adaptive management is logically prior to the
incentives, accountability, and flexibility problems when deciding
whether to use adaptive management in a specific context. Only if
learning is feasible does it make sense to worry about whether
managers want to learn, can be forced to learn, or can use knowledge
they acquire. Asking the information question is therefore a way of
asking whether adaptive management can succeed under a best-case
scenario. If the answer is yes, additional questions must still be asked
about how close we can come to that best case. But if the answer is
no, those other problems are irrelevant; adaptive management simply
is not a useful choice.
Second, there is good reason to think that the information
problem will frequently be a difficult one. Adaptive management
poses an underappreciated information conundrum." It is needed
only when lack of information undermines confidence in management
10. A number of authors have discussed these problems. Examples include Alejandro
E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management,
55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 323-35 (2007); Doremus, supra note 9, at 52-56; Ruhl & Fischman,
supra note 6, at 476; J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7
MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 21, 53 (2005); John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha,
Through a Glass Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and
Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249, 1256-63 (1993).
11. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
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decisions. It is substantively (as opposed to politically) useful,
however, only if that inadequate information base can and will be
supplemented over time in a way that increases confidence in future
decisions. The learning needed to make adaptive management
successful will often be difficult, even with the right motivation. It will
typically be costly, requiring added modeling, monitoring, and data
evaluation. The extra resources adaptive management requires will
not be well spent unless they produce useful information.
Finally, the information problem represents a gap in the
literature. Although some ecologists and economists have recognized
the information problem and begun to develop decision support tools
to address it,12 other thoughtful commentators still leave it out of their
descriptions of the prerequisites for adaptive management,' and
policy scholars seem not yet to have given it much thought. Perhaps
that is because solutions to the information problem seem, at least at
first glance, to lie peculiarly within the expertise of natural scientists.
Certainly natural science has a crucial role to play, providing tools
and techniques for undertaking and interpreting experiments or other
information-gathering efforts. But factors within the realm of law and
policy are also important because they can facilitate or complicate
data generation, sharing, interpretation, and use.
This Article explores the policy and institutional context for the
acquisition and use of information in the course of adaptive
management. The analysis builds on my earlier work on the
"information supply pipeline," the sequence of steps needed to take
information from the discovery phase to use in decisionmaking.14 I
assume for purposes of this analysis that managers are making good
faith efforts to achieve the goals set out by their governing statutes
12. See, e.g., Eli P. Fenichel & Gretchen J.A. Hansen, The Opportunity Cost of
Information: An Economic Framework for Understanding the Balance Between Assessment
and Control in Sea Lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) Management, 67 CANADIAN J.
FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCi. 209, 210 (2010); Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2412; Julien
Martin et al., Structured Decision Making as a Conceptual Framework to Identify
Thresholds for Conservation and Management, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1079,
1089 (2009); Tracy M. Rout et al., Optimal Adaptive Management for the Translocation of
a Threatened Species, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 515, 515 (2009); Michael C. Runge
et al., Which Uncertainty? Using Expert Elicitation and Expected Value of Information to
Design an Adaptive Program, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1214, 1214-16 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1691 (describing adaptive management as
"the most effective and efficient way to achieve management objectives" when the basic
conditions of a series of sequential decisions, uncertainty, and the ability to adjust are met,
with no mention of the ability to learn).
14. See generally Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management:
Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 407 (2008).
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and regulations." I am under no illusion that this assumption is
always (or even generally) correct. Indeed, the conviction that
managers cannot be trusted surely motivates much of the work on the
need to build accountability into adaptive management efforts. 6 But
making this assumption allows me to highlight challenges distinct
from the motivations of resource managers, challenges which must be
dealt with even if the incentives and accountability problems are
solved.
Analyzing adaptive management as an information problem
produces two pragmatically useful results. First, and perhaps most
important, it encourages recognition that adaptive management is not
always a desirable strategy and points to ways to determine whether
adaptive management will be helpful in specific contexts. The current
enthusiasm for adaptive management in the policy sector seems to
ignore this step. There is debate about how to do adaptive
management and a fair amount of handwringing about why it is not
more fully pursued," but not enough discussion about whether it
ought to be used.s
That needs to change. Adaptive management is not an end in
itself, nor is it always useful. It is a tool that can improve management
outcomes over time in some contexts. It does not come free, however.
Both the decision to employ adaptive management and decisions
about how to implement it involve tradeoffs. Adaptive management
increases the costs of management, complicates oversight, imposes
15. I also assume that managers have as much access to information as the regulated
community. Because my focus here is on public resource management, that is often,
although not always, a good assumption. To the extent that actions affecting managed
resources require government approval, it will generally be legally possible to require that
those seeking approval provide needed information.
16. See, e.g., Bruce Pardy, The Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management Part
V: Discretion, Complex Adaptive Problem Solving and the Rule of Law, 25 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 341, 347 (2008) (decrying the degree of administrative discretion in natural
resource management). On the prevalence of the principal-agent problem in natural
resource management and the need for accountability mechanisms to hold agencies to
their statutorily assigned tasks, see Holly Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The
Importance of Transparency in Natural Resource Regulation, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM
POLITICS 143,144-45 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006).
17. See, e.g., Carl Walters, Challenges in Adaptive Management of Riparian and
Coastal Ecosystems, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY (June 1997), http://www.ecology
andsociety.org/voll/iss2/artl/ (evaluating the "low success rates in implementing adaptive
management").
18. For an exception, see Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2414 (offering four criteria
for deciding whether the use of adaptive management is appropriate). Their analysis,
however, ends up focusing as much on the details of implementing adaptive management
as on the choice of whether to implement it.
1460 [Vol. 89
AN INFORMATION PROBLEM
added institutional demands, and is subject to misuse for political
ends." It requires striking a balance between short-term management
objectives and long-term learning, between devoting resources to
management and to monitoring,' and between finality and endless
political squabbling.2 1 It should only be used when the benefits of
learning exceed those costs over the relevant time frame.
In order to make sure that adaptive management is employed
only where it should be, and before deciding to implement it,
resource managers should undertake, and policymakers should
require, an explicit, formalized analysis of the prospects for learning
and its expected value for management. That analysis, which ideally
should be reviewed by leading technical experts outside the
management agency and periodically reexamined, can serve valuable
internal and external ends. Internally, it can force managers to
confront their assumptions about the system and their information
needs, providing a kind of intellectual discipline that prepares the
groundwork for learning. A thorough pre-adoption review of the
prospects for adaptive management improves any adaptive
management program ultimately adopted. Externally, it can provide a
different kind of discipline, enhancing accountability to management
goals by forcing managers to explain how they expect adaptive
management to help them achieve those goals.
Second, approaching adaptive management as an information
problem highlights systematic barriers to learning which can be
reduced by changes in law, policy, or institutional structure. While a
formal evaluation of the tradeoffs should be a prerequisite to
adaptive management, it is important to recognize that the calculus of
learning is not fixed. If the evaluation suggests that learning will be
difficult or costly, that need not be the end of the matter. Recognizing
barriers to gathering, exchanging, or using information is the first step
in reducing those barriers. It may turn out that some are illusory, or at
least not as high as they appear, while others can be reduced through
targeted or general policy choices.
Of course, many information challenges are context-specific and
cannot be resolved or even recognized outside that context. There are
some, however, which occur across a range of management contexts.
At least some of these systematic challenges can be proactively
addressed. Rapid diffusion of data, analytic tools, and theoretical
19. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
20. See infra text accompanying note 95.
21. See infra text accompanying note 94.
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insights is one recurring problem.2 2 There are relatively
straightforward (though not necessarily easy) ways to encourage
better movement of information through the system. Other recurring
challenges may require deeper policy and institutional changes that
are not likely to occur unless their potential to improve management
outcomes is recognized. Information generation can be promoted by
designating areas for experimentation and crafting general rules
specifying the conditions under which management experiments can
be conducted. Information utilization can be promoted through
employee selection and training, institutional design, and building
more effective connections between academic and applied scientists.
The argument proceeds in two major Parts. The first sets out a
framework for evaluating the usefulness of adaptive management. It
begins by reviewing the elements that must be present before
adaptive management should even be considered. It then considers in
more detail how the most challenging of those elements, the costs and
benefits (broadly defined) of learning, should be evaluated and
proposes a formal analytic approach. The second Part takes up the
question of what to do when the benefits of learning appear high but
are matched or exceeded by the costs. It contends that some
systematic barriers to learning can be addressed through policy
measures and offers recommendations. Finally, the Conclusion briefly
recaps the argument and key recommendations.
I. EVALUATING ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN CONTEXT
It is common ground at this point that natural resource
management 23 decisions must typically be made in the face of
incomplete knowledge about the systems being managed.24
Knowledge gaps impede management success in a variety of ways.
Most obviously, they undermine confidence in management
decisions, because actions taken under uncertainty might move the
system away from rather than toward the desired outcome. In
22. Doremus, supra note 14, at 434-39.
23. I use the terms "natural resource management" and "natural resource managers"
in this Article inclusively, to refer to those responsible for managing public natural
resources, such as the U.S. Forest Service ("USFS") and National Park Service, to those
responsible for managing built systems that use or impinge on public resources, such as
officials at the Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and also to
regulators responsible for setting limits on resource extraction and use, such as the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS").
24. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in
Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2007) ("Uncertainty is the
unifying hallmark of environmental and natural resource regulation.").
1462 [Vol. 89
2011] AN INFORMATION PROBLEM 1463
addition to raising the risk of management failure, knowledge gaps
can be paralyzing if managers are risk averse, preferring passivity to
taking the chance that their actions will make the situation worse.2
That sort of passivity might be desirable from a conservation
perspective where the relevant decision is whether or not to permit
new environmental impacts, but it is problematic where the status
quo itself is harmful to the environment, as is often the case for
managed natural systems.26
Knowledge gaps also can interfere with political and judicial
accountability. Uncertainty leaves managers free to make interpretive
judgments. They can often conceal those judgments, and the reasons
for the specific choices made, from public oversight with claims that
they are simply following the science.27 Uncertainty therefore makes
it difficult for the public to discern whether managers are doing their
best to follow legislative direction or instead bowing to political
pressure. It also complicates judicial oversight. Federal courts must be
at their "most deferential" when reviewing scientific determinations.'
They generally will not disturb an agency's interpretation of limited
or conflicting data.29 Uncertainty may, therefore, in effect, maximize
management discretion.30
25. My view that many managers are risk averse in precisely this way may require
some explanation. While I agree that resource management agencies often seem to bow to
political pressures in ways that put the resources under their supervision at risk, that's a
different problem. Recall that for purposes of this Article I assume that managers are
pursuing applicable statutory and regulatory goals in good faith. That assumption is, at a
minimum, not universally false; although their urge to act protectively surely can be
overcome by political pressures, often managers do try to protect the resources they are
charged with overseeing. In that context, I think there is good evidence that at least some
managers show risk aversion with respect to the tradeoffs between learning and risks to
the resource, and there is little evidence that any are prone to risk-taking. Examples of
risk aversion potentially inhibiting learning come from the reluctance of FWS to authorize
experimental high flows on the Colorado River because of possible impacts on the Kanab
ambersnail, Doremus, supra note 9, at 78-79, and the reluctance of water managers to
expend the resources of the Environmental Water Account created by the federal-state
CalFed program lest they be caught without water later when the fish could need it more,
ENVrL. WATER ACCOUNT REVIEW PANEL, FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT FOR THE CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM 16
(2001), available at http://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/2001-EWAScienceReview
_Workshop.pdf.
26. Doremus, supra note 24, at 555.
27. See Doremus, supra note 16, at 145-47.
28. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
29. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species
Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 429-30 (2004) (explaining how
courts approach reviews of technical decisions).
30. Biber, supra note 6, at 46-47; Doremus, supra note 24, at 574-77.
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Adaptive management has been touted as a way to deal with the
information deficit, allowing action in the face of uncertainty in the
short run while information gaps are filled in over the longer term.3 '
The concept was developed before large-scale anthropogenic climate
disruption was widely recognized as a problem,3 2 but climate change
makes it seem even more vital to effective resource management.33
There is no universal definition of the term "adaptive
management." It has been used to describe a range of management
strategies, but fundamentally any adaptive strategy must include at
least two key features: iterative decisionmaking and a commitment to
learning over time.' As originally envisioned by its primary
architects, adaptive management was a reaction to the perceived
inadequacies of management based on pre-decision comprehensive
analysis.
31. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy:
Lessons from the Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 102 (2007) ("The science
community first embraced adaptive management as a way to address the immense gaps in
our scientific knowledge and understanding of how ecosystems might respond to various
changes in conditions, whether natural or artificial."); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There
There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 249 (2004) ("Adaptive
management is designed to close the gap between the available information and the
information needed to make sound environmental decisions.").
32. The foundational works on adaptive management are ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978) and CARL
WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
33. See, e.g., Joshua J. Lawler, Climate Change Adaptation Strategies for Resource
Management and Conservation Planning, 1162 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 79, 86 (2009)
(noting that for all its challenges, adaptive management "is still likely to be one of the best
tools managers and scientists have to address climate change and to learn about its
effects").
34. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING 2 (2004) ("There are multiple views and definitions regarding
adaptive management, but elements that have been identified in theory and in practice
are: management objectives that are regularly revisited and accordingly revised, a
model(s) of the system being managed, a range of management options, monitoring and
evaluating outcomes of management actions, mechanisms for incorporating learning into
future decisions, and a collaborative structure for stakeholder participation and
learning."). Unlike some adaptive management proponents, I do not include collaborative
decisionmaking as a fundamental element. Adaptive management is a learning approach
to management. Collaboration is one possible method for making management decisions,
but it is not essential to learning, and in some circumstances might even be an impediment.
Whether and in what circumstances collaborative management might be appropriate is a
distinct question from whether adaptive management is appropriate, and the two are best
addressed separately.
35. Brad Karkkainen traces the roots of adaptive management much further back
than the work of Walters and Holling, locating them in the pragmatism of John Dewey.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 957-59 (2003). Others
have made the same connection. See, e.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE-
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In fact, many natural resource decisions need not be made once
and for all at the "front end." For large managed systems, like the
Florida Everglades, Chesapeake Bay, California Bay-Delta, national
forests, and national parks, decision points recur over time, providing
repeated opportunities for reconsideration and adjustment. In other
contexts, such as permits to fill wetlands or even permits to bury
streams with the waste from mountaintop removal mining, individual
decisions are made only once but the same type of decision is
confronted repeatedly. Although individual decisions cannot be
reversed, the effects of those decisions can inform later ones. Where
either direct or indirect opportunities exist for "back end"3 6
adjustment, management can be designed as a learning strategy.
Early proponents of adaptive management suggested that the
most efficient path to increased knowledge would be to design
management actions as deliberate and, to the extent possible,
controlled experiments to test explicit hypotheses about the system.
That strategy has come to be known as "active adaptive
management."37 Another version, known as "passive adaptive
management," however, has been more commonly implemented.
Passive adaptive management involves structured learning in the
absence of deliberate management experimentation.39 It relies on
monitoring the outcomes of management and using the information
gained to update beliefs about how the system operates. In either
form, adaptive management implies a humble attitude,' anticipating
the possibility of surprise and being prepared to detect and correct
management shortfalls.
INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 91-92, 100-01 (1993);
BRYAN G. NORTON, SUSTAINABILITY: A PHILOSOPHY OF ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 78-82 (2005).
36. On the "front end/back end" distinction and the need to be able to adjust policies
based on new information, see SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK
REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 177 (2003).
37. WALTERS, supra note 32, at 232. For a concise explanation of the distinction
between active and passive adaptive management, see Julie Thrower, Adaptive
Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible
Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 884-85 (2006).
38. Allan & Curtis, supra note 7, at 415.
39. WALTERS, supra note 32, at 248-52. Brad Karkkainen has provided an excellent,
concise explanation of the difference between active and passive adaptive management.
Karkkainen, supra note 35, at 950.
40. Virginie Maris & Arnaud B6chet, From Adaptive Management to Adjustive
Management: A Pragmatic Account of Biodiversity Values, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
966, 967 (2010).
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Currently, policymakers seem uniformly excited about adaptive
management. It has been mandated by federal and state legislation,
adopted by regulation, and applied through guidance and informal
mechanisms.4 1 Scholars are less sanguine. There is much enthusiasm
for the concept; indeed, given the shortage of front-end knowledge
about ecosystems and species, most observers agree that some form
of adaptive management is a necessity in many systems.42
Nonetheless, questions remain about both its feasibility and its
potential political pitfalls. On the feasibility side, it is not clear that
the law always does, or even should, offer enough flexibility to make
adaptive management possible.43 On the political side, claims of
adaptive management have been criticized as a false front, allowing
agencies to authorize environmental harm when it is uncertain
whether the extent of harm will exceed applicable legal limits."
Neither of those challenges are my concern here. Instead, I start
at the logical beginning. The first question to be asked is what
advantages, if any, adaptive management offers in any particular
natural resource management context. As explained in the next
section, adaptive management should be considered only if, at a
minimum, three conditions are met: there must be information gaps;
learning must be feasible; and there must be opportunities for
adjustment. Any decision to employ adaptive management should be
supported by an explicit analysis of all three questions. Although that
analysis need not be precise or quantitative, it should be sufficiently
41. In addition to the sources cited supra note 6, a few examples include 32 C.F.R.
§ 651.4(f)(3) (2010) (requiring that the Army's director of environmental programs
"[m]onitor proposed Army policy and program documents that have environmental
implications to determine compliance with National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")
requirements and ensure integration of environmental considerations into decision-
making and adaptive management processes"); 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c)(12) (2010) (requiring
that mitigation plan employ adaptive management to "guide decisions for revising
compensatory mitigation plans and implementing measures to address both foreseeable
and unforeseen circumstances that adversely affect compensatory mitigation success");
and 36 C.F.R. § 219.3(d)(8) (2010) (including "[m]onitoring and evaluation for adaptive
management" among the key elements of USFS planning). As Professors Ruhl and
Fischman explain, "With its core idea of 'learning while doing,'" adaptive management
"has become infused into the natural resources policy world to the point of ubiquity,
surfacing in everything from mundane agency permits to grand presidential proclamations.
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that these days adaptive management is natural
resources policy." Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 6, at 424-25 (citation omitted).
42. As J.B. Ruhl has pointed out, for example, "No serious assessment of the
[Endangered Species Act] fails to conclude that adaptive management ... is the preferred
method of implementation." J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case
Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1284 (2004).
43. Ruhl, supra note 10, at 31.
44. Doremus, supra note 9, at 52.
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detailed to support the conclusion that the learning adaptive
management is expected to generate will justify its costs. Requiring
such an analysis at the outset would reduce the ability of
policymakers or managers to use adaptive management as a tool for
delaying or avoiding difficult decisions, counter temptations to
convert management into a research exercise in which learning is
pursued for its own sake or uncertainty becomes an endless excuse
for inaction,45 and improve the effectiveness of adaptive management
when its use is appropriate.
A. Prerequisites for Successful Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is premised on the assumption that
learning is both plausible and valuable. It makes logical sense only if
three conditions are satisfied. First, there must be an information gap
that is important to management choices. Second, it must seem
possible to fill that gap on a management-relevant time scale. Third, it
must seem possible to adjust the initial decision over time in response
to new information.
1. Information Gaps
Adaptive resource management necessarily begins with an
information problem. The very premise of adaptive management is
that it will promote learning.' It is only useful if learning is needed,
that is, if information gaps limit resource managers' ability to
evaluate, at the initial time point, the likelihood that their choices will
achieve management goals.47 Absent such uncertainties, managers
45. See Fred A. Johnson et al., Conditions and Limitations on Learning in the
Adaptive Management of Mallard Harvests, 30 WILDLIFE SOC'Y BULL. 176, 182 (2002)
("[M]anagers must be careful not to turn large-scale management into a research
endeavor.").
46. See, e.g., Gregory et al., supra note 3, at 2412 ("The generally stated goal of
[adaptive management] is to improve managers' knowledge . . . .").
47. I am concerned here only with technical uncertainties, primarily natural science
uncertainties about the functioning of a species or ecological system and social science
uncertainties about changes in human pressures on systems. For purposes of this Article, I
put aside issues of "normative uncertainty," lack of knowledge about the values people
place on managed resources, and the potential for changes in those values. See Maris &
B6chet, supra note 40, at 966. I recognize the importance of that type of uncertainty and
unpredictability, particularly in the context of the massive reshuffling of the earth's
systems that greenhouse gas accumulation is causing. Certainly we need measures for
exploring societal conservation values and for adjusting management efforts in response to
durable value changes. But that is a set of issues for another article. Here I follow the lead
of early scientific advocates of adaptive management, who assumed that management
goals are exogenously fixed. See, e.g., Byron K. Williams et al., Uncertainty and the
Adaptive Management of Waterfowl Harvests, 60 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 223, 224 (1996)
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could confidently act on the basis of front-end knowledge. They
would not need adaptive management to facilitate later adjustment.
Because there is so much we don't know about the systems we
try to manage, uncertainty is nearly always great enough to justify
invoking adaptive management. Natural systems are not static; they
change over time in ways that are difficult to predict." Climate
change exacerbates the prediction challenge, increasing the
probability that managed systems will change rapidly, in unexpected
ways, and outside known historical boundaries.4 9 But the move
toward adaptive management predates widespread concern about
climate change because there is more to the information challenge
than instability. The complex connections among biotic and abiotic
elements of ecosystems are often poorly understood, as are responses
to management actions. 0 Even far less esoteric knowledge, such as
population sizes and trends, habitat requirements, and basic life
history information is frequently lacking. Finally, the control of
managed systems is always less than perfect. Rules do not
(describing adaptive management as "the ability to make optimal decisions over time
pursuant to stated objectives, in the face of uncertainty and recognizing some
constraints").
48. See, e.g., Gordon H. Reeves & Sally L. Duncan, Ecological History vs. Social
Expectations: Managing Aquatic Ecosystems, ECOLOGY & SOC'Y (Dec. 2009),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll4/iss2/art8/.
49. Climate disruption is rapidly disassembling today's climate envelopes and biotic
communities and reassembling them in ways that have no current analog. See Robert L.
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An
Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 844-49 (2009);
J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-
Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 17-26 (2008); John W. Williams et al., Projected
Distributions of Novel and Disappearing Climates by 2100 AD, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCI. 5738, 5738 (2007). Although natural resource management has long been plagued by
uncertainty, climate change "raise[s] uncertainty to a level humans have never
encountered and governments have never attempted to manage." Alejandro E. Camacho,
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning
Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 15 (2009).
50. On the complexity of environmental systems and the difficulties that complexity
poses, see Bryant, supra note 7, at 175-76 (explaining that at least nine theories have been
offered to explain the decline of the Stellar sea lion); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities
Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 145, 148-55 (2003); Stephanie Tai, When Natural Science Meets the Dismal Science,
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 958-59 (2010). Lack of knowledge about underlying biological
mechanisms, and the corresponding lack of ability to predict responses to management,
has been called "structural uncertainty." Williams et al., supra note 47, at 225. Structural
uncertainty may be rampant even in systems with a long history of management. See id. As
an example, although migratory waterfowl harvest has long been regulated, the
relationship between harvest levels and population changes has been obscured by
uncertainty about whether harvest adds another source of mortality or simply replaces
other causes of death. Id at 225-26.
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automatically generate absolute compliance," tracking of resource
use may be poor,5 2 and it may not be possible to keep the system
within desired management parameters. Under the circumstances, the
only real surprise for managers would be if they weren't surprised by
the way the system reacts to their efforts and outside events over the
course of time.
Although this requirement will rarely turn us away from adaptive
management, directly confronting it is an important prerequisite to
undertaking effective adaptive management. For one thing, it
emphasizes the need for clear goals set exogenously to the adaptive
management process. Without identified management goals, it is
impossible to understand what relevant information is missing.
Looking for information gaps, therefore, necessarily forces managers
to identify their goals and to seek clarification if those goals are
inadequately defined.
Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the adaptive management
literature rejects the idea that goals are exogenous to the adaptive
management process. Although there are those who contend that
clear goals are a necessary starting point for adaptive management,
others, including some leading adaptive management theorists, argue
that management goals themselves should be evaluated and
reconsidered as part of the adaptive management cycle.' That view is
mistaken; it seeks to sweep too much into a process with important
limitations. Management goals for public and quasi-public natural
resources are, and should be, politically determined. What resources
society should protect, and what tradeoffs it should make between
conservation and other values are not scientific questions. The
51. Williams et al., supra note 47, at 225.
52. In California, for example, where limited water resources are the subject of
constant conflict, many diversions are still not directly monitored. Elliot Rector, From
Paper to the Real World: Stopping Illegal Water Diversions in California, ENvTL. DEF.
FUND (Aug. 4, 2010), http://blogs.edf.org/waterfront/2010/08/04/from-paper-to-the-real-
world-stopping-illegal-water-diversions-in-californial. Although diverters are required to
file statements of diversion, enforcement has been weak. Id. Last year a bill that would
have strengthened enforcement and monitoring measures stalled because of opposition
from water users. S.B. 565, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_05510600/sb_565_bill_20100816_amended
asmv92.pdf; Dan Bacher, Delta Advocates Oppose Fran Pavley's SB 565, INDYBAY
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2010/08/25/18656797.php; Rector,
supra.
53. See, e.g., Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1684 ("A clear statement of objectives is
essential.").
54. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 35, at 62-63; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34,
at 24.
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answers are a function of social values rather than of technical
understanding. Surely those values shift over time, and goals must
periodically be reexamined and adjusted. But adaptive management
as it is conventionally practiced does not provide the right forum for
making such adjustments.
Adaptive management structures typically require periodic
meetings of a select group to review data and technical documents. 5
Those meetings are effectively inaccessible to most members of the
public. Only those with enough of a stake in the outcome to devote
large amounts of time to it will even bother, and only technical
experts or those who can afford to hire experts will be comfortable
with the discussion. 6 Furthermore, management quickly becomes
unwieldy as the size of the group increases; as a practical matter,
adaptive management is incompatible with a large-scale, generalized,
open-invitation political process. It is not, therefore, the right place to
make decisions which should take account of all views.
A second benefit of explicitly identifying information gaps is that
it would focus the attention of managers on areas where learning
would be most helpful and encourage them to identify uncertainties
that may be hidden within their assumptions. Forcing people to
explain and justify their understanding of a system sometimes leads to
the discovery that they do not understand parts of it as well as they
thought. Simply going through the exercise of drafting a model of the
system and thinking through the various factors that might affect the
ability to achieve management goals can help raise awareness of
possibilities that might otherwise not be considered until much later.
Finally, an explicit information gap analysis is the first step in
identifying why information is missing and how it might be obtained.
As discussed in more detail below, there are many potential sources
of uncertainty, and distinguishing between them is crucial to
understanding how likely it is that learning will occur, at what cost,
and by what pathways.
2. Good Prospects for Learning
The second requirement for successful adaptive management is
the ability to learn. Adaptive management will not improve
55. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive
Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 21-24 (2010)
(describing the structure of the adaptive management program for Glen Canyon).
56. See Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The
Elevation of Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 931-33 (2008) (describing
dominance of economic interests in Glen Canyon adaptive management program).
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management outcomes unless important information gaps are
narrowed over time. But therein lies a conundrum. If we know so
little at the outset that we feel the need for adaptive management,
why should we believe that we can learn rapidly enough to be able to
correct management mistakes? The answer turns on the sources of
initial uncertainty and the relevant management timeframe.
If the source of key information gaps is simply that it is difficult
to predict exogenous future changes to a managed system, then
opportunities for learning should be plentiful and relatively
inexpensive. As the future unfolds, some things will become apparent.
For example, there is currently considerable uncertainty about how
global warming will affect precipitation in California." That makes it
difficult for those who manage the state's water system to plan for the
future, and in turn for those responsible for the conservation of
aquatic ecosystems to evaluate the effects of water management on
their charges. There is nothing conceptually difficult, however, about
learning over time how precipitation patterns are changing. It
requires only regular observation coupled with regular updating of
the climate models. That sort of learning does not seem to require
any special efforts, and we can have high confidence that it will occur.
That does not automatically mean that adaptive management
will always be useful where uncertainty is primarily a matter of seeing
how the future develops. That depends not only on the ability to fill
information gaps but on the speed with which learning will occur.
Although we can be confident that we will learn over time about
altered precipitation regimes, we cannot be as confident that we will
learn quickly. Because California's annual rainfall is already highly
variable, and it is expected to become more so, 8 it may take many
years before the new regime is well enough understood to support
confident management decisions. Furthermore, because change will
continue for decades or centuries,5 9 the process of updating our
understanding will have to continue as well.
57. For the Sacramento region, for example, six global climate models project that
precipitation may decrease by nearly twenty percent or increase slightly by the end of this
century. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., USING FUTURE CLIMATE PROJECTIONS TO
SUPPORT WATER RESOURCES DECISION MAKING IN CALIFORNIA 8 (2009), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-500-2009-052/CEC-500-2009-052-F.PDF.
58. See Bohumil M. Svoma & Robert C. Balling, Jr., United States Interannual
Precipitation Variability over the Past Century: Is Variability Increasing As Predicted by
Models?, 31 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 307,307-08 (2010).
59. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP 1
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
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Another common source of uncertainty is lack of knowledge
about how potential management actions will change the system. Like
uncertainty about the future, this type of uncertainty will sometimes
be conceptually easy to address. Trial and observation may be all we
need to reduce it. But observation is sometimes difficult, and again
this sort of learning may take a long time by management standards.
The Chesapeake Bay, for example, is impacted by nutrient pollution
from many sources, including runoff from agricultural lands.'
Although it is widely agreed that dealing with the Bay's pollution
problem will require some changes to management of those lands, the
learning curve will not be rapid."1 Scientists working on water quality
in the region believe it will take at least nine years to recognize how
changes in agricultural practices affect water quality in the Bay.62
Nutrient pollution from farming practices also affects the Gulf of
Mexico; runoff conveyed via the Mississippi River system is believed
to be largely responsible for the low-oxygen "dead zone" which
develops in the Gulf every summer.6 Given the larger size of the
watershed and greater distance from the estuary, connecting changes
in agricultural practices to water quality in the Gulf with any degree
of confidence could take decades.'
Other uncertainties carry a time lag for institutional rather than
scientific reasons. In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, nutrient
loading does not come entirely from nonpoint sources. The precise
contribution of point sources such as wastewater treatment plants is
not known, however, because few sources directly monitor their
effluent for nutrients.65 In theory, monitoring could be instituted
immediately and would immediately provide useful information.
There is even a ready-made institutional hook for imposing nutrient
monitoring requirements: point sources must have discharge
CLIMATE CHANGE 1-18 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007); Susan Solomon et al.,
Persistence of Climate Changes Due to a Range of Greenhouse Gases, 107 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. SCI. 18,354, 18,354-55 (2010).
60. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL ExECuTIvE SUMMARY,
at ES-3 (2010), http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/pdflpdf-chesbay/FinalBayTMDLJ
BayTMDLExecutiveSummaryFINAL122910_final.pdf.
61. See COMM. ON THE MISS. RIVER & THE CLEAN WATER ACt, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS FOR IMPROVING WATER QUALITY IN THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN AND NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO 21 (2009) [hereinafter
NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS].
62. Id.
63. Id. at 18,21.
64. Id. at 21.
65. Id. at 15.
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permits,' and those permits must require monitoring and reporting of
discharges.67 Regulators can require point sources which discharge
nutrients into impaired waterways to monitor and report the nutrient
content of their effluent. But that can't be done overnight. Regulators
must wait until permits are renewed to impose new conditions. That
should not introduce a lengthy lag; under the federal Clean Water
Act, discharge permits have a nominal five-year life span.' In
practice, however, many permits are allowed to run much longer than
five years.69 Regulatory agencies simply do not have the resources to
review and revise each of the hundreds of thousands of discharge
permits nationwide 70 every five years.
Learning about changes wrought by management actions is also
conceptually straightforward, but the practical challenges quickly
become steep. At the outset, we may have little confidence in our
predictions about, for example, how restoring a seasonal floodplain
will affect the population of an endangered fish that used to spawn on
the site.7 1 Monitoring population size and breeding success following
restoration efforts should help us figure out how the fish have
responded. The data are not likely to be as clearcut or easy to acquire
as temperature and precipitation data, however. Many species are
66. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1362(6), 1362(7), 1362(12) (2006).
67. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2010).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B).
69. Permits are administratively continued if the permittee timely files for renewal.
Permits which are continued pending renewal are described as "backlogged." NPDES
Permit Program Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/
home.cfm?programjid=45 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). The Environmental Protection
Agency's ("EPA") most recent backlog report shows that between ten and twenty percent
of permits (depending on the region) are backlogged. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PERMIT STATUS REPORT FOR NON-TRIBAL MAJOR INDIVIDUAL, MINOR INDIVIDUAL,
AND NON-STORMWATER GENERAL PERMIT COVERED FACILITIES-DECEMBER 2009
(1), at 1-2, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/grade-all.pdf.
70. As of 2001, EPA reported that more than 400,000 facilities nationwide were
required to have National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits,
and that number was growing. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PROTECTING THE NATION'S WATERS THROUGH EFFECTIVE NPDES PERMITS: A
STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2001 AND BEYOND 1 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/
npdes/pubs/strategicplan.pdf. There are over 33,000 point source permits in the Mississippi
watershed alone. NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS, supra note 61, at 15.
71. The efficacy of flood plain restoration for Delta smelt is one of many questions
dogging efforts to improve the ecological health of California's Bay-Delta. A recent
National Research Council report concluded that the relationship is still poorly
understood and there is scant scientific justification for a regulatory requirement to create
or restore habitat. COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE WATER & ENVrL. MGMT. IN THE CAL. BAY-
DELTA, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES
FOR REDUCING WATER MANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON THREATENED AND ENDANGERED
FISHES IN CALIFORNIA'S BAY-DELTA 54-55 (2010).
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difficult to census accurately, even with considerable effort.72
Furthermore, trends may be difficult to interpret. Natural variability
in population size, breeding success, habitat usage, and other factors
may be so high that it masks changes, positive or negative, caused by
management actions.73
Confounding environmental variables add yet another layer of
complexity. Pacific salmon offer a familiar example. Seeking to
reverse the salmon's decline, resource managers have ordered
reductions in irrigation deliveries and changes in the operation of
hydropower dams.74 But shifts in ocean conditions can mask the effect
of those steps, so that managers may not be able to tell whether their
efforts are helping or not.75 Another example comes from the
Colorado River system, where experimental releases from Glen
Canyon Dam were instituted in the 1990s in the hope of promoting
72. Again the Delta smelt, which is notoriously difficult to census, provides an
example. See, e.g., Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-cv-1207 OWW GSA,
2007 WL 4462395, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) ("All parties agree that there is no firm
and reliable total population estimate for the Delta smelt and there never has been.... No
scientist was able to explain how, despite the marshaling of federal, state and private
resources, over ten testifying experts presented in this case, and over ten years of study,
what is necessary and how long it will take to produce a reliable total population estimate
for Delta smelt."); WIM KIMMERER & RANDY BROWN, CALFED BAY-DELTA
PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL WATER ACCOUNT: SUMMARY OF THE ANNUAL DELTA
SMELT TECHNICAL WORKSHOP (2003), available at http://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/
pdflEWADeltaSmeltWorkshop.pdf (noting disagreement over population estimates).
73. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 6, at 23-24 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing
natural variability from anthropogenic impacts); Helen M. Regan et al., A Taxonomy and
Treatment of Uncertainty for Ecology and Conservation Biology, 12 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 618, 620 (2002) (explaining the role of natural variation in creating
uncertainty).
74. See, e.g., NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., Sw. REGION, ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND CONFERENCE OPINION ON
THE LONG-TERM OPERATIONS OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND STATE WATER
PROJECT 574-80 (2009) (detailing changes to water project operations needed to comply
with Endangered Species Act); Michael C. Blumm et al., Practiced at the Art of Deception:
The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36
ENVTL. L. 709, 734-63 (2006) (detailing terms of biological opinions governing Columbia
River hydropower operations).
75. See COMM. ON PROT. & MGMT. OF PAC. NW. ANADROMOUS SALMONIDS, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
39-74 (1996) (detailing the effects of changing ocean conditions and a variety of human
activities on salmon). How little is still known about the dynamics of salmon populations
was brought home in the summer of 2010 when a record sockeye run, more than twenty
times as large as the previous year, in British Columbia took fisheries scientists and
regulators by surprise. Kate Larkin, Canada Sees Shock Salmon Glut, NATURE (Sept. 3,
2010), http://www.nature.comlnews/2010/100903/full/news.2010.449.html.
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recovery of downstream aquatic ecosystems."6 Populations of the
native humpback chub rebounded somewhat after the experimental
releases, but given the wealth of other factors, managers could not say
with confidence that the rebound was directly linked to the releases,
or determine exactly what their influence was.77
Controlled experiments potentially offer one way out of this type
of indeterminacy. Indeed, the purpose of controlled experimentation
is to sort among possible causes of an effect, distinguishing the most
important factors from others or identifying the roles of multiple
factors.78 The potential informational power of experiments explains
the emphasis of early adaptive management theorists on management
experiments. But the ability to experiment may be, or at least appears
to be, limited in managed systems. The potential for and limits of
experimentation are considered in more detail in the next Part.
Two other sets of information gaps are more difficult to
recognize and very challenging to fill. First, there is often a dearth of
background information about managed systems. For many species
and ecosystems it is literally true, as Joni Mitchell sang, that "you
don't know what you've got till it's gone.",7  Research science is
skewed toward subjects that are charismatic, economically valuable,
or easy to study.so Often we don't realize how much we don't know
about a system and its components until it hits a crisis point." At that
point, it is too late to go back and generate historic data. The lack of
such baseline information can pose a serious problem for adaptive
management because some types of learning cannot be rushed. Years
of data are required to understand the extent of natural variability in
76. Sandra Zellmer, Floods, Famines, or Feasts: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Winter 2010, at 20, 24.
77. Susskind et al., supra note 55, at 28-29.
78. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better
Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1059-60 (1997) (explaining the
power of experiments).
79. JONI MITCHELL, BIG YELLOW TAXI (A&M Studios 1970).
80. See, e.g., Berta Martfn-L6pez et al., What Drives Policy Decision-Making Related
to Species Conservation?, 142 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1370, 1379 (2009) ("Research
goals, therefore, tend to focus on those species that have direct economic impacts or are
considered 'cute' or 'charismatic' by society...."); John R.U. Wilson et al., The
(Bio)Diversity of Science Reflects the Interests of Society, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY &
ENV'T 409, 411 (2007) (finding that invasive vertebrates are more studied than
invertebrates or plants).
81. In many cases, for example, little is known about an endangered species before it
is proposed for protected status. Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource
Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 297-98 (2005); Dale D.
Goble, The Endangered Species Act: What We Talk About When We Talk About Recovery,
49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 16 (2009).
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some populations and habitat conditions, for example, and that
understanding in turn may be crucial to interpreting population
fluctuations.
Finally, there are what Donald Rumsfeld famously called the
"unknown unknowns," the things we don't even realize that we don't
know.' They include facts or behaviors we could have discovered but
hadn't thought to look for because we were focused on other aspects
of the system. For example, protection of the marbled murrelet, a
small Pacific coast bird listed as threatened under the Endangered
Species Act, has focused on restricting timber harvests in the bird's
nesting areas. That is necessary, but it turns out that it may not be
sufficient to protect the bird. Several years ago, a university research
group decided to investigate whether changes in foraging conditions
might also be contributing to the species' decline.' They found that
the amount of krill and small prey species in murrelet diets had
increased over the past century relative to sardines and other larger
predatory fish.' This avian version of "fishing down the food web,"
they speculated, might be reducing the energy gain per amount of
fishing effort, contributing to reduced reproductive success.86 That
discovery has led to increased attention to the potential effects of
commercial and recreational fishing on murrelets."
82. Rumsfeld tied himself in verbal knots trying to explain to the press the various
kinds of uncertainty. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense, U.S. Dep't of Def.,
Department of Defense News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12,
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636
("[A]s we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not
know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know.
And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the
latter category that tend to be the difficult ones."). Although his syntax was inelegant, the
point is a good one; if you don't know what to look for, you are not likely to find it.
83. REGION 1, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE MARBLED
MURRELET (WASHINGTON, OREGON, AND CALIFORNIA POPULATIONS) 79-111 (1997)
(detailing regulatory protections implemented for the murrelet, almost entirely focused on
protecting forest nesting habitat).
84. Benjamin H. Becker & Steven R. Beissinger, Centennial Decline in the Trophic




87. Other "unknown unknowns" may include surprises in the form of unanticipated
changes in the system, like the encroachment of the barred owl into the range of the
threatened spotted owl, a stress which has interacted with others, including logging, to
contribute to the owl's decline. The relative contributions of logging and invasive species
became a topic of controversy in 2008, when the FWS issued a revised recovery plan for
the threatened northern spotted owl which emphasized the contribution of the barred owl
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We cannot specifically identify unknown unknowns at the outset
of a management program. As discussed in the next Part, however, it
is possible to structure management and monitoring efforts, and to
coordinate them with outside research, in ways that enhance the
likelihood that unknown unknowns will be sought and found.
3. Opportunities for Adjustment
The third prerequisite for adaptive management to be useful is
that there must be opportunities to adjust management efforts over
time. That means that initial management steps must not become
immediately locked in, either formally by law or informally by reason
of their practical effect. Adaptive management cannot help when
there is no way to correct an initial mistake, as for example when the
decision in question is to allow irreversible alteration of the
environment. Even in that context, however, a form of adaptive
management or progressive "learning while doing" can be helpful
when managers face many similar decisions over time, such as
evaluating permits to fill wetlands or take endangered species."
It also means that managers must periodically reconsider and
reevaluate their management decisions in light of their improved or
revised understanding of the system. New institutional structures and
legal mandates may be needed to make reconsideration both
mandatory and transparent enough to allow effective public
oversight, because management revisions are a notorious point of
slippage between the theory and practice of adaptive management. 89
to the spotted owl's woes. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (STRIX OCCIDENTALIS CAURINA), at viii (2008), available at
http://www.fws.gov/ecos/ajax/docs/recovery-plan/NSO%2Final%2ORec%2OPlan%20051
408_1.pdf. Faced with highly critical peer reviews and litigation, the FWS voluntarily
withdrew the 2008 plan; a new draft version has recently been issued. U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., DRAFT REVISED RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTIED
OWL (STRIX OCCIDENTALIS CAURINA) (2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/
OREGONFWO/Species/Data/NorthernSpottedOwlfRecovery/LibraryDocuments/201ONSO
DraftRevisedRecPlan.pdf. Mistakes about parameters we think we understand also fall in
this category. In the Chesapeake Bay, for example, EPA's Draft Total Maximum Daily
Load ("TMDL") specifies the total nutrient loading the agency believes the Bay
ecosystem can tolerate while meeting the goal of preserving all its uses. U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, at 1-1, 2-7 (2010), available at
http://executiveorder.chesapeakebay.net/post/TMDL-appendices.aspx. If that target turns
out to be wrong (at least if it turns out to be wrong in the direction of allowing too much
pollution), it will need to be adjusted if the management objective is to be met.
88. Doremus, supra note 24, at 557.
89. See, e.g., April Reese, Colorado River Adaptive Management Program Needs
Overhaul, Critics Say, LAND LETTER (May 7, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/
publiclLandletter/2009/05/07/01 (noting that despite thirteen years of evidence gathering,
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Finally, it means that there must actually be alternative policy
choices. Carl Walters, one of the fathers of the concept of adaptive
resource management, once described a rich set of policy alternatives
as the critical factor in the success of adaptive management.9 0
B. Doing the Math
Even if all of the required elements are in place, adaptive
management is not necessarily the right strategy. A rough calculation
is needed to determine if its benefits justify its costs. Adaptive
management should not be undertaken lightly. It requires more
resources than conventional management9' because doing it right
requires taking the time to carefully analyze the system at the outset,
monitoring the results, and periodically reassessing and revising.92 It
imposes unfamiliar demands on management institutions for long-
term commitment of human and financial resources.93 In addition to
using government resources, adaptive management may impose
greater demands on stakeholders, who must monitor decisions and
the decisionmaking process not just at one point in time but
continually. Because it implies that decisions are always tentative, it
may also increase or extend controversy and conflict,94 despite claims
to the contrary. Finally, it may require trading the anticipated best
"the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group, or AMWG, has never
reached sufficient consensus to execute its primary charge-recommending a new dam
operations policy to the Department of Interior").
90. CARL WALTERS, SRP REVIEW OF PATH PRELIMINARY DECISION ANALYSIS
REPORT ON SNAKE RIVER SPRING/SUMMER CHINOOK 1 (1998), available at
http://efw.bpa.gov/Environment/PATH/reports/pdar/index.html. Noting the tendency for
scientists charged with developing adaptive management programs to develop multiple
hypotheses but gloss over policy alternatives, Walters pointed out that "the few adaptive
management success stories have involved the opposite: relatively few response
hypotheses, but a very rich set of policy alternatives." Id.
91. Carolyn Brickey et al., How to Take Climate Change into Account: A Guidance
Document for Judges Adjudicating Water Disputes, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,215, 11,227
(2010).
92. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 6, at 29 (noting costs of monitoring); Walters, supra
note 17 (noting that costs of modeling, monitoring, and experimentation often stand in the
way of implementing adaptive management).
93. See Camacho, supra note 49, at 74 (noting the importance of sustained funding for
successful adaptive management); Holly Doremus et al., Making Good Use of Adaptive
Management 13 (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 1104, 2011), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/AdaptiveManagement_1104.pdf ("[Aldaptive
management cannot succeed without funding that is both stable and sufficient.").
94. Doremus, supra note 9, at 55; Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why
Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen
Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV. 893, 945 (2009).
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outcome in the short-term for long-term learning and improvement."
Adaptive management should be used only if the tradeoffs appear to
offer a net benefit, measured in terms of improved likelihood of
meeting management goals.
Unless the three factors discussed above-significant information
gaps, opportunities for learning, and opportunities for adjustment-
are all present to some degree, adaptive management is a nonstarter.
But the analysis is more nuanced than that, particularly with respect
to the prospects for learning, which is never a simple yes or no
question. What is needed is a kind of broad-brush cost-benefit
analysis evaluating the tradeoffs inherent in choosing an adaptive
approach. In most cases, that will boil down to estimating the
expected value of learning for achieving management objectives, and
comparing that added value to the costs and complications it will
impose. That is not an easy task, and we should not expect anything
like precise quantification. The analysis itself will, of course, consume
agency resources. But I am convinced it will be worth it, leading to
more self-conscious management even if the choice is not to
undertake an adaptive approach. And although it imposes significant
costs at the beginning of a management program, it could save
resources down the line by making it clearer what needs to be
periodically evaluated and how that evaluation should be done.
The analysis I envision begins by setting out the applicable
management goals. As discussed above, management goals should be
exogenous to the adaptive management process. To the extent that
statutory goals are, as is so often the case, vague or conflicting, they
should be clarified at the outset. In other words, an agency planning
to undertake adaptive management (or considering whether to
undertake it) should identify what it views as its management goals as
well as metrics believed to indicate achievement of those goals."
The next step is articulation of a model of the managed system.
An explicit model is generally recognized as a core element of
adaptive management.' It is also essential to making an informed
95. See Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1691; see, e.g., Gretchen J. A. Hansen & Michael
L. Jones, The Value of Information in Fishery Management, 33 FISHERIES 340, 340 (2008);
Michael A. McCarthy & Hugh P. Possingham, Active Adaptive Management for
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 956, 963 (2007).
96. The metrics, unlike the goals, are appropriately, even necessarily, subject to
reevaluation within the adaptive management process. Technical experts must periodically
reevaluate whether the selected metrics accurately represent achievement of the relevant
management goals.
97. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 24-25.
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decision on whether or not to undertake adaptive management. The
model need not be elaborate. Depending upon the management goals
and level of knowledge at the start, it can be as simple as a schematic
diagram or brief narrative, or as elaborate as a detailed computer
model. Its function is both to discipline managers' thinking and to
make that thinking accessible to stakeholders. It should highlight key
elements of the system for management purposes, their
interconnections, their relationship to the management goals, and
their expected response to management alternatives. It should
explicitly acknowledge uncertainty and competing hypotheses.
Comparing the model to management objectives should highlight
what managers hope to learn through adaptive management. In
particular, it should make apparent the "known unknowns," areas of
uncertainty or competing hypotheses that are important to achieving
the desired management outcomes. The regulation of duck hunting in
the United States, a longstanding and relatively successful example of
adaptive management,98 provides a good example. The management
goal is sustainable harvest; therefore, the key management question is
how hunting mortality will affect population abundance and
productivity." The key uncertainties are whether most of the birds
killed by hunters would have died from other causes anyway or
whether instead their deaths must be added on to natural mortality,"o
and the extent to which reproduction declines with increasing
population density.'
Using mathematical models groundtruthed by comparison to
monitoring data, researchers showed in 1996 that harvest levels could
be deliberately varied to distinguish between the two possibilities,
accelerating learning." There are often tradeoffs between learning
and resource protection, however; in the waterfowl example, the
authors noted that "the most informative harvest strategy is also the
most extreme."10 Those tradeoffs must be evaluated in context; the
more irreplaceable the managed resources, the more conservative we
may want to be in pursuing learning. On the other hand, the greater
98. The FWS, which regulates hunting of migratory waterfowl, has used a strategy it
calls adaptive harvest management since 1995. See Johnson et al., supra note 45, at 176.
That strategy has produced significant learning in the form of updated probabilities
assigned to the four competing models employed. Id. at 180.
99. Id.
100. The competing mortality models are generally referred to as additive or
compensatory mortality, respectively. See, e.g., id. at 177.
101. Id. at 177-78.
102. Williams et al., supra note 47, at 228-29, 231.
103. Id. at 230.
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the economic consequences of the decision, that is, the greater the
economic value of resource exploitation, the more important learning
may become.
Economic analysis,'1 structured decisionmaking,10o and other
tools"o have been proposed for evaluating the tradeoffs. Notably, in
some cases, running the analysis reveals that learning overall is less
valuable than managers had expected,'" or that "active" adaptive
management, involving deliberate management experiments, adds
little to simple observation of the results of more conventional
management choices.108 For our purposes, the precise tool employed
is not crucial. What is important is that the analysis be done explicitly
and transparently, that it consider the available avenues for
investigation, observation, and hypothesis testing, and that managers
explain and justify their choice of analytic tools. Undertaking this
analysis will also require managers to reveal the extent to which they
believe their mandated goals require or permit discounting of future
benefits. The value of learning in relation to its costs will depend
critically on the extent to which long-term conservation is valued over
the short-term economic consequences of experimentation or
intervention.109
In cases of very high value resources, very high uncertainty, or
very sharp political conflict over management choices, it may be
useful to invoke peer review of the model and the prospects for
learning."0 This is the sort of setting in which peer review can be most
helpful, sharpening the agency's attention to gaps in its knowledge,
unrecognized assumptions, and new or emerging methodologies."
104. See, e.g., Fenichel & Hansen, supra note 12, at 209.
105. Martin et al., supra note 12, at 1079.
106. Rout et al., supra note 12, at 515.
107. RAY HILBORN & CARL G. WALTERS, QUANTITATIVE FISHERIES STOCK
ASSESSMENT: CHOICE, DYNAMICS AND UNCERTAINTY 494 (1992) ("Often this step in
the analysis reveals that there is a 'robust' policy that should do very well, no matter which
model is correct, so that only minor gains would be expected from having better
information.").
108. Johnson et al., supra note 45, at 182.
109. If an aggressive discount rate is applied, management as a learning exercise will
rarely appear economically justified. Carl J. Walters & Roger Green, Valuation of
Experimental Management Options for Ecological Systems, 61 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 987,
996 (1997).
110. Because it carries its own significant costs, peer review should not be applied to all
management decisions. See J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the
Endangered Species Act, 83 NEB. L. REV. 398, 422-25 (2004) (noting that peer review
mandates might do more to smother than to improve agency decisions).
111. For contrasting views on the role of peer review, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan
Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB.
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Peer review at this stage is less likely to become a political football or
to be perceived as a threat to agency autonomy or authority than
review of individual regulatory decisions. Peer review of this sort is
likely to be most effective if it is conducted by outsiders with strong
inside support and a medium- to long-term commitment.1 12 Outsiders
should have independence from the agency's mission, culture, and
process, so that they are able to take a fresh look and to demand a
clear explanation. Inside support, from the head of the agency or
equivalent, can ensure that agency personnel take the peer review
process and resulting critiques seriously, but can also provide a check
on unrealistic reviewer assumptions. A long- or at least medium-term
commitment means that the review process, like the management
process, is ongoing. Managers who must report every year to the
same review committee are more likely to seriously address that
committee's concerns than those who receive a one-time report but
will never be faced with tough follow-up questions.
In sum, resource managers and policymakers should not blindly
assume that adaptive management is the best strategy. Before
committing to it, they should undertake an explicit, structured
analysis of its benefits and costs. That analysis should clearly set out
management goals, articulate an initial model of the system, identify
important data gaps, and evaluate the prospects of filling those gaps.
Such a structured analysis is essential for making a reasoned decision
to use or eschew adaptive management, but it will be useful beyond
that gateway decision. It will provide a starting point for choosing
initial management actions and drawing up a monitoring strategy."' It
should also set the stage for periodic reevaluation by clearly setting
out the assumptions to be tested and reconsidered.
One shortcoming of this sort of analysis, however, is that it
invites a static approach, taking as given the perceived limits on
learning, such as restrictions on experimentation. It ought to highlight
those constraints, but it is not likely to question them. Nor is it likely
to address overarching features of a learning-friendly environment. In
other words, by its very nature this sort of individual, project-specific
approach is likely to treat the learning equation as fixed.
LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 32-35 (2005); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of
Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 43-54 (2006).
112. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 111, at 33.
113. Although detailed monitoring is often assumed to be a necessary component of
adaptive management, it is not always the best use of limited resources. Alana L. Moore &
Michael A. McCarthy, On Valuing Information in Adaptive-Management Models, 24
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 984,991 (2010).
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The costs of learning, however, are not necessarily fixed. They
can be altered by a variety of policy measures independent of any
individual management effort. So while this sort of specific analysis is
needed to make informed choices about specific uses of adaptive
management, it is not the end of the story. At a broader level, we
need to look at and address how learning occurs in natural resource
management agencies and why it does not, with the aim of reducing
the costs of learning and the time it takes.
II. REWRITING THE LEARNING EQUATION
The structured analysis recommended above may conclude, for a
particular resource problem, that learning would improve
management but also that learning will be costly and challenging.
That result, when it occurs, presents a dilemma: will it be worth
investing in adaptive management or not? Managers could try to duck
that question by adopting a less information-intensive strategy, such
as technology-based or best-management-practices mandates, or a
precautionary approach. For reasons I have previously articulated,114 I
believe reducing information demands will often not be practical or
politically palatable. It therefore becomes important not only to
evaluate the relative costs and benefits of information, but to shift
that equation where feasible by increasing the availability of useful
information.
Whether, to what extent, and how the costs of learning can be
reduced of course varies with the specific context. But there are some
general policy steps that can improve the prospects for learning by
natural resource managers. They fall in two categories: improving
information production and improving information diffusion.
A. Facilitating Information Production
Often, management-relevant learning requires the generation of
new information. In some cases, that may mean that new tools for
inquiry or methods for interpreting existing data need to be
developed. Those are matters for the natural scientists to tackle. But
in other cases, there are policy barriers, or at least apparent policy
barriers, to inquiry or learning. Those are for the policy wonks to deal
with. Policy barriers may be context-specific, but some, such as
impediments to experimentation and funding challenges, are general
and can be addressed by general policy steps.
114. See Doremus, supra note 14, at 410-11.
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1. Experiments and Experiment Substitutes
There are often serious barriers to conducting experiments in
managed natural systems. Some of the limits are technical; for
example there may be so many confounding, uncontrollable factors
that experiments would not generate useful information. Others are
practical; for example, the value of infrastructure like large dams to
human populations, coupled with the expense and time needed to
rebuild them, precludes taking one out even if we thought we could
thereby gain useful information about threats to imperiled salmon
populations. Still others are policy-mediated; for example, laws like
the Endangered Species Act impose substantive limits on the risks to
which some managed resources can be subjected,"' and
environmental analysis and planning laws may require that the
impacts of management be articulated in advance and in detail.116
All of these barriers to effective experimentation, even those
which do not originate from the legal or institutional regime, can be
addressed to some extent by policy and institutional changes.
Requiring the explicit analysis of the prospects for and costs of
learning advocated above would improve information production.
Where learning is necessary and likely, but experiments seem too
risky or impractical, managers can look for substitutes for direct,
controlled experimentation. Model runs can sometimes stand in for
active manipulation, although it may be difficult to gain enough
confidence in the model without the ability to perform on-the-ground
experiments, and modeling can itself become an excuse for an infinite
search for perfect understanding prior to taking action."7
Models can serve another function, though, helping managers
evaluate and limit the potential negative impacts of experiments.
Simulating an experiment before actually attempting it, using a range
of inputs reflecting the competing hypotheses, should signal the
extent to which the experiment poses risks of disastrous impacts.
Managers can then plan for those risks, developing monitoring plans
to detect adverse effects and planning to end the experiment if the
effects exceed predetermined acceptable levels. Medical trials offer a
useful analogy. The medical community understands the value of such
trials, but is also sensitive to the twin risks that the experimental
treatment may prove harmful or that it may prove so much more
115. On the ESA and experimentation, see Doremus, supra note 9, at 79-80.
116. On the NEPA as a barrier to experimentation, see Doremus, supra note 14, at
454-55.
117. Walters, supra note 17.
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effective that the placebo or control treatment appears harmful by
comparison. Ethical considerations require that the perils such
trials pose be justified at the outset by the learning they promise, that
outcomes be monitored on an ongoing basis, and that they be halted
if new information shows that the risk-benefit balance is outside the
acceptable range."1
Of course those decisions are not easy, and they depend on the
relative value decision makers assign to learning and protecting
resources.120 But articulating and justifying sideboards in advance
would allow stakeholders to have their say about the value of learning
and acceptability of risk. It also could solve a potential legal problem.
Under the Endangered Species Act, federal actors must insure that
their actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any listed species.121 The Act allows federal authorities to issue
permits for actions undertaken "for scientific purposes or to enhance
the propagation or survival of the affected species,"122 provided the
jeopardy threshold is not crossed. Scientists sometimes complain that
research permit requirements stand in the way of needed studies.123
Those complaints should be taken seriously, but they need not be
blindly accepted given the very high importance research scientists
tend automatically to assign to learning. They should instead be
examined in light of societal judgments about the risks and value of
learning. Sideboards that limit risk could help reduce permit paralysis
118. See Paul S. Mueller et al., Ethical Issues in Stopping Randomized Trials Early
Because ofApparent Benefit, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 878, 878 (2007).
119. Steven N. Goodman, Stopping at Nothing? Some Dilemmas of Data Monitoring in
Clinical Trials, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 882, 882 (2007).
120. Clinical trials pose exactly the same dilemma. Whether and when to stop them
is an extraordinarily difficult question, as scientists will differ in their assessment of
both how much we have learned and how much we need to learn. There is no clear
ethical guidance on the matter; a utilitarian perspective will put more weight on
the fate of future patients, whereas ethical theories that place more value on
obligations and individual dignity will favor the interests of patients in the trial.
Id.; see also Mueller et al., supra note 118, at 878-79 (warning against trial-stopping rules
that allow a trial to be terminated too easily based on the perceived benefits of the
treatment because investigators may be biased in favor of overestimating benefits and
underestimating adverse effects).
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
122. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
123. Karen A. Bjorndal et al., Better Science Needed for Restoration in the Gulf of
Mexico, 331 SCIENCE 537, 538 (2011); Brian W. Bowen & Wayne N. Witzell, Introduction:
Sea Turtle Conservation Genetics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
ON SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION GENETICS, at 1, 5-7 (Brian W. Bowen & W.N. Witzell
eds., 1996).
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(to the extent it exists) by making it easier to demonstrate at the
outset that the jeopardy standard is satisfied, and reassuring
managers, wildlife agencies, and environmental interests that
experiments will remain within acceptable bounds. 12 4
Another potential strategy is to conduct experiments in limited
portions of a system. For large systems, that may be practical even if
the experiments pose a risk of local harm to the managed resource or
the economy. A National Research Council ("NRC") committee
recently proposed such a strategy to test the effectiveness of nutrient
pollution control actions for reducing the Gulf of Mexico's hypoxic
"dead zone" and the social and economic effects of those actions.125
The committee suggested a set of pilot projects which could generate
information needed to guide larger-scale control efforts.126 Pilot
projects are always vulnerable to the criticism that they are simply
delaying tactics; if they seem promising, advocates might ask why not
launch them at a large scale immediately. That question reinforces
the importance of the analysis recommended in the first Part of this
Article. A clear explanation of the extent to which pilot projects will
provide needed information, and the potential costs if they were
undertaken more broadly but turned out not to be as effective as
hoped, could help reassure a variety of publics about the need for and
value of experiments.
Small-scale experiments also can provide useful information
about management actions taken in several locations. Salvage
logging, the controversial practice of rapidly harvesting timber after a
fire, is a good example. Timber-dependent communities object to the
time necessary for detailed environmental study because lumber
value rapidly deteriorates once trees have been killed.127
Environmental interests, by contrast, see salvage logging as an excuse
to harvest trees that may not in fact be dead, and believe it harms
wildlife and slows forest regeneration.1" Fierce disagreement about
the desirability of salvage logging has produced a flood of litigation.
"The courts have been barraged with lawsuits by environmental
groups over allegedly ill-conceived post-fire salvage logging
124. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
125. NUTRIENT CONTROL ACTIONS, supra note 61, at 28.
126. Id.
127. Kathie Durbin, Unsalvageable, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 16, 2005),
http://www.hcn.org/issues/298/15501.
128. Reed F. Noss et al., Managing Fire-Prone Forests in the Western United States, 4
FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV'T 481, 485 (2006); Durbin, supra note 127.
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projects."129 In 2005, a Ninth Circuit panel chastised the U.S. Forest
Service ("USFS" or "Service") for ignoring opportunities to study
and learn from salvage logging operations,'13 0 but later the full court
decided that it owed the Service more deference.
Alternatively, it might be possible to carry out experiments in
analogous systems where environmental or economic risks are lower.
Networks of lands designated for experimental purposes could
provide useful study sites. The USFS already has a system of eighty
experimental forests and ranges scattered across the country.12
Originally established in 1908, the system has grown in a fairly ad hoc
manner, but it contains representatives of the majority of U.S. forest
cover types and a broad range of environmental conditions. 3 The
experimental forest system hosts a number of long-term studies with
both management and basic science implications." It could be put to
better use to serve current management priorities, however, through
better networking, more centralized management and oversight, and
addition of new sites which provide good models for key management
issues. Moreover, the system could be expanded to include federal
lands beyond the national forests.
Finally, natural resource agencies should be prepared in advance
to take advantage of learning opportunities offered by unplanned
"experiments" like the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of
Mexico, and by management actions which are likely to have later
analogues, such as dam removals.135 Some federal researchers should
always be "on call" for reassignment to unexpected or rapid
developments, and federal research units should plan studies of
potentially precedent-setting events. A discretionary pot of rapidly
129. Robert B. Keiter, Breaking Faith with Nature: The Bush Administration and
Public Land Policy, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 195,217 (2007).
130. Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled by
Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
131. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 992-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
132. Experimental Forests and Ranges, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV.,
http://www.fs.fed.us/researchlefr/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
133. Ariel E. Lugo et al., Long-Term Research at the USDA Forest Service's
Experimental Forests and Ranges, 56 BIOSCIENCE 39, 43 (2006); Experimental Forests and
Ranges, supra note 132.
134. Lugo et al., supra note 133, at 44-45.
135. See, e.g., K.M. Kibler et al., Learning from Dam Removal Monitoring: Challenges
to Selecting Experimental Design and Establishing Significance of Outcomes, RIVER RES.
& APPLICATIONS, June 7, 2010, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doil
10.1002/rra.1415/full; Noreen Parks, A Ravenous River Reclaims Its True Course: The Tale
of Marmot Dam's Demise, SCI. FINDINGS, Mar. 2009, at 1, 1-5, available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/scienceflscifilll.pdf (describing removal of the Marmot Dam in
2007).
2011]1 1487
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mobilizable grant funds should also be maintained for such
contingencies.
2. Budgeting for Learning
The salvage logging and hypoxia examples mentioned above lead
to another topic-budget structuring-which may unintentionally
limit the ability to experiment. In federal natural resource agencies,
research and management work is generally the province of distinct
divisions; although budgeting practices vary, research and
management budgets are sometimes also separated.' If researchers
and managers jointly agree to conduct management experiments,
there may be difficult issues about who should bear the costs.
Research budgets may be too small to support large-scale
management experiments, but managers may resist experiments if
they have to pay the costs. 13 7
A better architecture for learning could include research funding
dedicated to projects jointly conceived and executed by research and
management personnel. Management incentives could more strongly
encourage research. Evaluation of managers for career advancement
could consider the extent to which they have made progress in
addressing key knowledge gaps. Researchers, at least those who
control funding decisions, could be provided similar incentives by
explicitly evaluating them on the extent to which they have helped
resolve management uncertainties.
The federal research budget in a global sense also needs to better
support indirect learning through studies related to managed systems
but not tied directly to short-term management issues. A portion of
federal research funding should be more closely coordinated with
management priorities, but with a long-term focus. Such studies may
136. The USFS is an example; Research and Development is one of five USFS
program areas, each with its own mission. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE U.S. FOREST
SERVICE-AN OVERVIEW 13 (n.d.), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/documents/
USFSAnOverview_0106MJS.pdf. Research and development has its own budget line
item. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OVERVIEW 16
(n.d.), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/budget/2012/justification/FY2012-USDA-
Forest-Service-overview.pdf. NMFS does its budgeting differently. Research work at
NMFS is overseen by the Office of Science and Technology. Organization Chart, NOAA
FISHERIES SERv., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/org-chart.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
But budget requests combine research and management. NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BUDGET ESTIMATES FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 231, available at
http://www.corporateservices.noaa.gov/nbo/fyl2-presidents-budget/NOAAFY12 PB.pdf.
137. Such budget issues reportedly doomed a proposed USFS large-scale salvage
logging study. Interview with Ann Bartuska, Deputy Under Sec'y for Research, Educ., &
Econ., U.S. Dep't of Agric., in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8,2010).
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be the best way to attack the "unknown unknowns." This sort of work
can probably best be done in the academic world, where freewheeling
inquiry is rewarded and failure is more likely to be tolerated.
Admittedly, it will be tricky to distribute this sort of funding
effectively because the incentives are not well calibrated either for
those who might distribute the funds or for those who seek funding.
Managers typically want to emphasize short-term results, while
research scientists are very good at claiming that their pet project fits
whatever real-world priorities funders articulate. Perhaps the best
way to distribute such funds would be through an advisory body with
long-term ties both to management agencies and to academic
researchers.
A potential model is EPA's Science to Achieve Results
("STAR") program, which provides funding for "targeted research
that complements" research done at federal laboratories.3 s The
STAR program funds work EPA views as important to its mission,
but does not have the capacity to carry out at its own research
facilities. EPA aspires to "focus STAR research on gaps in knowledge
related to EPA's mission, its high-priority research needs, and
subjects with the greatest uncertainty and potential impact." 39
Toward that end, review of STAR proposals includes a novel step;
proposals rated as eligible for funding on the basis of scientific merit
are then separately evaluated for relevance to the agency's mission. 40
It is not clear, however, that the STAR program has found the right
balance between highly focused, short-term research and longer-term
exploration. In a 2003 review, the NRC noted that the program had
moved to a greater emphasis on solicitation of focused research as
opposed to exploratory work.141 The NRC also recommended that
EPA engage outsiders in identifying research priorities, perhaps
beginning with a "state of the science" review of key areas to identify
potential for high-impact research.142 That outside perspective could
also be a valuable counterweight to the natural agency tendency to
emphasize quick results.
138. Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl. Research, STAR Grants and Cooperative Agreements, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncerabstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/
recipients.welcome/displayOption/grants (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
139. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MEASURE OF STAR: REVIEW OF THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S SCIENCE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS (STAR)
RESEARCH GRANTS PROGRAM 123 (2003).
140. Id. at 48-49.
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id. at 6-7.
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B. Improving Information Diffusion
The production of information is only the first step in the
information pipeline. Much data and information simply sits in
reports or journal articles. It is not useful for management efforts
unless it reaches the people who must make management decisions
and reaches them in a form they can use. Information diffusion is
therefore a key step in learning. It is also one where bottlenecks are
common.143 Two major sets of policy efforts could reduce barriers to
effective information diffusion: improvements in data architecture
and the creation or improvement of intermediaries who can more
effectively link information producers with information users.
1. Data Architecture and Information Flow
One of the most frustrating impediments to learning in federal
resource management agencies is lack of information sharing. It is
widely recognized that data, including basic environmental
documents like Environmental Impact Statements ("EIS") and
Endangered Species Act biological opinions, are not archived in ways
that facilitate sharing within agencies, between agencies, and with the
larger research community.1" Nor are they produced in a common
format that would facilitate data exchange and synthesis.1 45 Even
within a single agency, data may be collected and compiled at many
different offices, in ways that make meaningful aggregation
impossible. Modernizing environmental information architecture will
impose some short-term costs, but could be accomplished in any
administration willing to make it a priority.
Two key steps could make information more accessible and
useful. First, the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")146
should establish uniform standards for natural resource information
143. Doremus, supra note 14, at 434-39.
144. See, e.g., Edward A. Boling, Toward a Better NEPA Process for Decisionmakers,
39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,656, 10,658-59 (2009); James L. Connaughton, Modernizing the
National Environmental Policy Act: Back to the Future, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8-9
(2003); Doremus, supra note 14, at 438; Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and
Climate Impact Assessments: Learning from NEPA's Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,605,
10,610-12 (2009); Michael B. Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information
Technology to Improve the Environmental Impact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
18, 30-34 (2003).
145. Doremus, supra note 14, at 438-39.
146. The CEQ, established by NEPA, is the environmental arm of the Executive
Office of the President. Council on Envtl. Quality, About, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administrationleop/ceq/about (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). It is,
therefore, the office in the best position to centralize administration environmental policy.
[Vol. 891490
AN INFORMATION PROBLEM
formatting, presentation, and archiving, to facilitate aggregation,
comparison, and cross-agency use. Second, individual agencies which
generate or use classes of environmental analyses should make them
available in searchable database form. So, for example, the various
regional offices of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and
National Marine Fisheries Service should digitize all their
Endangered Species Act biological opinions (in a format established
by CEQ) and make them available through a centralized access point
with search capabilities. EPA, which is statutorily required to review
all federal EISs,47 could host an EIS database. USFS, Bureau of Land
Management, National Park Service, and FWS land management
planning documents could form another database. Modem
information tools could do much more, of course, such as linking
geographically related documents with geographic information
system ("GIS") tags.1" However, the first step, which would be
enormously helpful in facilitating the kind of learning needed for
effective adaptive management, would be simply to create digital
databases.
Such a step is conceptually simple, but of course more difficult in
practice. It will impose short-term resource costs, while the payoff will
be slower to materialize. It will require commitment and leadership
from the White House and sustained funding from Congress. But if
we are to make learning-based management strategies effective, it is
the sort of infrastructure investment we need to make.
2. Trusted Intermediaries as Information Diffusion Agents
The question of how managers seeking to implement adaptive
management or other information-intensive strategies obtain useful
information is one that has not received enough attention in the
policy literature. Natural resource managers are, I believe,
systematically risk-averse in the sense that they do not want the
resources under their supervision to be harmed by their management
choices and, perhaps even more strongly, they do not want to be
blamed for any harm the resources suffer.14 9 They are also typically
resource-limited, understaffed, and overcommitted. They do not have
a lot of time to keep up on the latest literature and ideas or to
consider how ideas developed in other contexts might help them in
their tasks. Their staff, which is often heavy on bachelors- and
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2006).
148. See Farber, supra note 144, at 10,610-11.
149. See supra note 25.
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masters-level expertise, may not have the background or training to
make those judgments effectively or with confidence. Resource
management agencies may, therefore, fall behind on awareness of
both data and new techniques that could be helpful in achieving their
goals.
One way to read the much-criticized opinion of the Seventh
Circuit in Sierra Club v. Marita5 o is as a cautionary tale about
knowledge diffusion. The Marita decision dealt with management of
lands within the national forest system.' Plaintiff environmental
groups asserted that the USFS had ignored the theory of island
biogeography and its lessons for the size of reserves needed to protect
native species.'52 They contended that the Service had ignored well-
established scientific principles, submitting more than 100 published
articles in support of their position."' The Service responded that,
although the theory of island biogeography was "of interest," it had
not yet been applied to forest management in the region.154 In
essence, the Service argued that it was not sure how to apply the
theory to its work, and was not required to make figuring that out a
priority.' 5 To the horror of conservation biologists,156 the court sided
150. 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995). For a sampling of critical commentary, see Greg D.
Corbin, The United States Forest Service's Response to Biodiversity Science, 29 ENVTL. L.
377, 404-07 (1999); Doremus, supra note 24, at 576-79; Patricia Smith King, Applying
Daubert to the "Hard Look" Requirement of NEPA: Scientific Evidence Before the Forest
Service in Sierra Club v. Marita, 2 WisC. ENvTL. L.J. 147, 158-70 (1995); Brian Scott
Pasko, The Great Experiment That Failed? The Role of a "Committee of Scientists" as a
Tool for Managing and Protecting Our Public Lands, 32 ENVTL. L. 509, 532-36 (2002);
Courtney Schultz, Responding to Scientific Uncertainty in U.S. Forest Policy, 11 ENVTL.
SCL & POL'Y 253, 259-61 (2008). But see Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn
from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 247-52 (2002) (arguing that
scientific evidence does not support the notion that declines in forest species are primarily
a result of fragmentation); A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity and Endangered Species, in
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 311,319 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002).
151. Marita, 46 F.3d at 608.
152. Id. at 617-18.
153. Id. at 618.
154. Id. at 618-19.
155. See id.
156. Both the Society for Conservation Biology and the American Institute of
Biological Sciences appeared as amici in support of the Sierra Club. Id. at 621. Shortly
after the decision was issued, for example, a letter to the editor in the Society for
Conservation Biology newsletter called for members to write to the chief of the USFS,
urging greater use of conservation biology in forest management decisions. Randy Webb,




with the USFS, deferring to its determination that application of the
theory was uncertain.157
Of course it may be that the USFS rejected the Sierra Club's
suggestions simply because it wanted to get out the cut. But in this
and other situations it may also be true that information, and an
understanding of the potential implications of new information or
methodologies for management, is limiting. It is difficult for resource
managers like the USFS to keep up with the latest developments,
especially if their application to management problems is indirect or
unclear. Courts, which are especially deferential to methodological
choices and decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty,5 are not
well-suited to police that sort of ignorance. Improved knowledge
diffusion would both provide tools for managers who are genuinely
committed to their assigned tasks and reduce the availability of
uncertainty as an excuse.
Efficient and effective knowledge diffusion often depends on the
availability of intermediaries who have the trust of the parties to
whom they are bringing knowledge as well as the expertise and
resources needed to get that knowledge. One possible model would
be an academic corps modeled on the Cooperative Extension Service
("CES"), which was launched in 1914 to help bring the agricultural
research being produced in the land-grant colleges to farmers. 59 Its
statutory purpose is explicitly one of knowledge diffusion: "to aid in
diffusing among the people of the United States useful and practical
information on subjects relating to agriculture .. . and to encourage
157. Marita, 46 F.3d at 621. Of course there was more to Marita than the question of
how specifically the plaintiffs' preferred scientific methodology had been articulated with
respect to the lands in question. Doremus, supra note 24, at 577 ("Marita is a difficult case
to parse, in part because the opinion wanders back and forth between disagreements
about goals and disagreements about methods of ensuring that those goals are achieved.").
At a minimum, the decision was motivated in part by the idea that the governing statutes
required the USFS to consider values other than preservation and the court's belief that,
even with respect to preservation, the USFS was entitled to some deference to its
understanding of what elements it was mandated to preserve.
158. In Marita, the USFS argued that the theory in question "had been developed as a
result of research on actual islands or in the predominantly old-growth forests of the
Pacific Northwest and therefore did not necessarily lend itself to application in the forests
of Wisconsin." Marita, 46 F.3d at 622. That may have been just an attempt to justify a
management decision reached for other reasons, but it is not implausible that something
like that reasoning may have been part of the decisionmaking process. In either case, the
court agreed, ruling that "however valid a general theory may be, it does not translate into
a management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete situation." Id. at 623.
159. David W. Cash, "In Order to Aid in Diffusing Useful and Practical Information":
Agricultural Extension and Boundary Organizations, 26 ScI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 431,
433-34 (2001).
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the application of the same.""so CES, which includes specialist
researchers based at the land-grant universities and their experiment
stations and county agents with offices in rural areas, seems to
successfully mediate both the transfer of knowledge from the
universities to farmers and communication in the other direction
regarding issues farmers regard as research priorities. 6 ' It transfers
not only data but methods, such as up-to-date models, to diffuse
users. 162
Crucial to the transfer function is that extension agents enjoy the
trust of farmers and have regular opportunities to interact with them
both formally at conferences and informally based on relationships
built over the years. The trust of researchers is also important. In the
case of CES, much of the applied research is carried out by extension
specialists based at universities and agricultural experiment
stations.163 Those researchers may themselves regularly meet with
their agricultural constituents, or they may interact primarily with
county agents who then interact with the farmers." The key point is
that there needs to be an intermediary organization which enjoys the
trust, respect, and attention of both knowledge producers and
knowledge consumers.
In the resource management context, that role seems to be
limiting. There certainly are extension agents and researchers who
focus on the intersection between agriculture and resource
conservation, but their association with agriculture can lead to
distrust by environmental interests and resource managers who view
their mission as conservation. There also are research arms of federal
resource management agencies, such as the USFS' Research and
Development unit, whose mission is "to develop and deliver
knowledge and innovative technology to improve the health and use
of the Nation's forests and grasslands-both public and private."6 s
But something seems not to be going as well as it could in the delivery
phase. Curiously, of all its various constituencies, the one least
satisfied with the USFS's research and development operations is the
160. 7 U.S.C. § 341 (2006).
161. Cash, supra note 159, at 439-40.
162. Id. at 439-41.
163. Id. at 433-34.
164. Id. at 439-40.
165. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FISCAL YEAR 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 3




USFS itself.'" Federal information users have little confidence that
products of the research and development operation will provide
feasible solutions to their problems or help them anticipate emerging
problems."'7 The high rate of litigation focused on the science of
USFS management decisions'is suggests that external stakeholders
are also unsatisfied with the way science is making its way into the
management process, though they blame managers rather than
agency researchers.
To the extent that entities with a resource management
knowledge translation mission already exist, perhaps they simply
need more funding or a renewed focus on delivering useful
information to resource managers in a timely fashion. I believe,
however, that some structural and cultural changes would also be
useful. There should be more opportunities for research and
management personnel within agencies to work together on designing
and implementing studies to address management needs.16 1
Performance measures for research units should explicitly include the
development and provision of management-relevant information, in
conjunction with managers. 70 In addition, more emphasis should be
put on synthesis and on conveying information not generated by the
intermediary organization. Resource managers do not need to learn
of every individual study relevant to their work in isolation. Indeed,
paying too much attention to individual studies outside the larger
166. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., AMERICAN CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
INDEX 15 (2006), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/research/pdfl2006_fs-rd_customer
_satisfaction survey-final-report.pdf (showing satisfaction rate of sixty-eight percent for
USFS "customers," lower than other federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations,
educators, or any other users).
167. Id. at 18-19.
168. For a review of this litigation in the Ninth Circuit and the difficulties it has caused
that court, see generally Sara A. Clark, Taking a Hard Look at Agency Science: Can the
Courts Ever Succeed?, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317 (2009).
169. See David W. Cash et al., Countering the Loading-Dock Approach to Linking
Science and Decision Making: Comparative Analysis of El Nio/Southern Oscillation
(ENSO) Forecasting Systems, 31 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 465, 467-68 (2006) (noting
the need for "coproduction" of information through collaborations between researchers
and users). At least some USFS researchers are well aware of the value of these kinds of
cooperative efforts and their role in promoting knowledge diffusion. See Emile Gardiner
et al., Establishing a Research and Demonstration Area Initiated by Managers: The Sharkey
Restoration Research and Demonstration Site, 106 J. FORESTRY 363, 363-64 (2008).
170. On this score, the USFS's current strategic plan is lacking. The performance
measures it proposes for the Research and Development office include only customer
satisfaction and numbers of patent applications. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV.,
USDA FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2007-2012, at 24 (2007), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/strategic/fs-sp-fy7-12.pdf. Conspicuously missing is any
measure of the extent to which research improves management outcomes.
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context can increase confusion, leaving resource managers uncertain
whether they should recast their management efforts every time a
new study comes out."' What is needed instead is periodic updating
of the overall state of the field and interpretation and synthesis of the
totality of knowledge by those with knowledge both of the relevant
science and of management needs. Unfortunately, that sort of
synthetic work generally falls between the cracks. Researchers tend
not to be rewarded for it, while managers tend not to have the time or
expertise to do it well.
Although some of the needed entities, or similar entities which
could be converted to a diffusion function, already exist within the
federal government, there is no reason why this role needs to be
confined to government entities. It is essential only that
intermediaries have the trust of both researchers and managers. In
the resource management world, there may be nongovernmental
organizations, such as The Nature Conservancy, which are well-
positioned to fulfill that role.
CONCLUSION
Adaptive management subsumes many different challenges. It is
an incentives problem, an accountability problem, and a flexibility
problem. But it is also an information policy problem, and that aspect
has been underappreciated. Before deciding to employ, or to
continue to employ, an adaptive approach to management, and
before determining the parameters of such an approach, managers
should undertake an explicit, structured analysis of the need for and
practicality of learning.
This is not a new or radical idea; Hilborn and Walters, who are
among the leading scientific proponents of adaptive management,
called for it nearly twenty years ago in the context of fisheries
management:
Once a clear set of alternative hypotheses or stock response
models is available, it is worth doing a simple calculation of the
expected value of perfect information .. . in order to determine
whether further adaptive policy analysis is worthwhile. The
essential idea behind this calculation is to find the policy option
171. Health care providers and consumers suffer this sort of confusion when they are
buffered by unfiltered news of, for example, every major study on the efficacy of
mammograms for breast cancer detection and treatment. See, e.g., Sorting Through




that would be best if there is no future learning . . . , then to see
how much improvement could be obtained from that
nonadaptive baseline if it were known for certain which model
is correct, that is, if perfect information were suddenly
available.172
Yet many policymakers and public resource managers still have
not learned this important lesson. As a result, adaptive management,
which is a form of structured decisionmaking,73 is frequently required
or adopted without any structured analysis of the benefits it is
expected to produce or the tradeoffs inherent in realizing those
benefits. That in turn leads to the cynical (but not necessarily false)
assumption that the purpose of adaptive management is to reduce
political pressures or evade oversight, rather than to improve
management outcomes. If adaptive management is truly necessary,
the ongoing confidence of stakeholders as well as policymakers will
be needed to sustain it. If it is not truly necessary, it should not be
employed. Either way, a formal, structured analysis at the point of
deciding whether and how to use it will be helpful.
In some crucial cases, that analysis will show that learning,
although valuable, would be costly or difficult. All is not necessarily
lost in those cases. Some barriers to learning are the result of policy
choices. The right policy steps might be able to reduce those barriers
sufficiently to make important learning practicable. There are
systematic steps that can encourage the production of relevant
information and facilitate its diffusion to managers in a form they can
trust and use. Those steps are not costless in the short run, but they
should pay dividends over time.
Sometimes, though, the conclusion will simply be that adaptive
management is not the right choice. Perhaps the costs of learning are
too high and cannot be lowered through any feasible measures.
Perhaps the opportunities to adjust management efforts are too
limited. In those cases, the structured analysis recommended here can
provide a needed reality check, reminding managers and
policymakers not to count on adaptive management to justify action
in the face of important uncertainties or to prevent or correct
management errors. Faced with the reality that adaptive management
is not a panacea, policymakers may have to directly confront difficult
questions about the relative costs of different sorts of errors and
172. HILBORN & WALTERS, supra note 107, at 493.
173. Lyons et al., supra note 4, at 1684.
2011]1 1497
1498 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
develop forthright approaches to making decisions in light of
uncertainty.
